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Introduction
Politicians and military leaders often site deterrence-specifically nuclear deterrence-as a backdrop for United States national security relations. Nuclear deterrence is regarded as a foundational underpinning of international relations. The US Minuteman III (MM III)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force has been a valuable element of American deterrence for over 50 years, but the world strategic environment has significantly altered the context in which this non-mobile ballistic missile system exists. With new political realities and technological capabilities, the MM III ICBM-in its current operational configuration-has been rendered superfluous with regard to strategic nuclear deterrence. This paper will explore those geopolitical and technological changes with regard to deterrence theory and the MM III system, and will recommend adjustments to US strategic posture. First, this paper will discuss deterrent theory and the goal of deterrence. Second, this paper will review the background of the ICBM by examining the evolution of politics and advancement of technology that shaped the current US strategic deterrent posture. Specifically, national security concerns coupled with existent technical constraints led to the deployment of the ICBM as part of a strategic nuclear triad that capitalized on the ICBM's positive attributes.
Third, this paper will provide rationale for why the MM III is no longer relevant to strategic deterrence by explaining its decreased military utility, diminished deterrent utility, and those factors that make its use untenable. It is the convergence of these factors that undercuts the fundamental nature of deterrence-capability and credibility. Finally, this paper provides suggestions for an updated US nuclear posture. Recommendations include deploying a survivable land-based deterrent, adopting and announcing a minimal deterrence policy, and conducting a conventional versus nuclear capabilities assessment. Ultimately, the US should evolve its strategic deterrent posture and adopt new deterrent policies to best serve continuing national security objectives.
Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence has been a de facto foundational underpinning of modern international relations for all states, but especially the nuclear states. 1 At the core of deterrence theory, the goal is to prevent, or deter, an adversary from exercising an undesired course of action either by reducing his expected gain or by increasing his perceived cost to such an extent that the course becomes undesirable. 2 With regard to nuclear deterrence, the threat of nuclear retaliation-either as a response to an attack or a first strike to defend vital national interestsresults in -too high a cost‖ to the adversary. Examples include the US threat of a nuclear strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the promise of nuclear retaliation against the USSR in response to an attack on the US or NATO.
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Deterrence theory assumes that a rational adversary will conduct a cost/benefit analysis that results in a conclusion that a course of action will not be worth undertaking and is thusly deterred. Attributed as fundamental to successfully deterring an adversary is a demonstrated credible capability, a credible will to use the capability, and a communicated promise to use the capability. Capabilities vulnerable to a first strike undermine deterrent stability as they are -use or lose‖-specifically they invite a first strike or compel a hasty response. 4 Survivable weapons are credible as they are protected from preemptive destruction and available for a retaliatory strike. This will have special relevance with regard to the MM III as it pertains to modern deterrence.
There are several variations to the implementation of deterrence-direct, extended (indirect or -umbrella‖), and ambiguous-that alter the nature of who is deterring whom. But the fundamental core remains the same: threat of a costly response. Several states cite nuclear deterrence as a fundamental element of nation security, including US, 5 Russia, 6 France, 7 United
Kingdom, 8 China, 9 India, 10 Pakistan, 11 and North Korea. 12 The United States and Russia have fielded nuclear forces at levels that strive for parity. These -warfighting‖ force levels strive for a strategic balance of enough weapons to annihilate opposing nuclear weapons and facilities.
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Other nations-France, UK, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel-have adopted minimal deterrence postures, i.e., they maintain only enough weapons to inflict an unacceptable punishment on an opponent. 14 Augmenting its claimed nuclear capability, North Korea operates with a conventional deterrence, e.g., significant military capabilities such that it could inflict staggering damages on South Korea using conventional forces alone.
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These nuclear states deter directly with their own arsenals, but other states, e.g., Japan, Australia, and NATO allies, benefit from extended, or umbrella, deterrence by relying upon a promise of US nuclear retaliation if they are attacked. 16 This form of deterrence requires belief that the promise of retaliation in accordance with mutual defense treaties will be carried out.
Uncertainty in this promise was cited as one of the reasons the UK developed their own deterrent arsenal, to provide a -second decision center‖ willing to employ if the US would not respond on behalf of the UK. 17 France had similar motivations in developing their own capability.
18
Current US nuclear forces consist of a triad that includes the ICBM.
Shaping Deterrence and the ICBM
The ICBM made sense in the political and technological environment of the Cold War.
The US required a weapon system that could deter and respond to a surprise strike, either by launching quickly before being struck or by surviving the attack for future use-the ICBM provided both of these characteristics. ICBMs could be geographically dispersed and deployed in sufficient numbers to achieve strategic parity with the USSR. Adversary defenses are also much more capable than when ICBMs were conceived and deployed. With predictable flight trajectories, ballistic warheads are susceptible to missile defense intercepts from dedicated anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, such as the Moscow ABM site, as well as advanced air defense systems, to include the Russian S-300, S-400, and S-500 systems. 32 The currently operational S-300 and S-400 systems claim advanced capabilities against ballistic missiles at speeds of 4,800 meters per second; Russia has sold these systems to 12 nations. 33 One recipient, Iran, claims to have created its own spin-off system even more sophisticated than the S-300. 34 When operational in 2012, the S-500 is expected to outperform the S-400. 35 Ground based missile defenses can easily -out-proliferate‖ incoming warhead numbers. The net effect is a lower probability that a ballistic warhead would arrive at its intended target. A destabilizing loss of deterrent capability could follow from a perception that inbound ballistic warheads can be defeated.
Additionally, peer competitors are familiar with Minuteman warhead capabilities and have hardened targets or located potential facilities to render them relatively impervious to a strike. A target can be hardened to an extent that a successful strike would require a weapon with such a high yield and degree of accuracy as to be unobtainable. 36 For instance, studies deemed -both ground bursts and multiple strikes [are] necessary to achieve a high probability of destroying the newest hardened Russian silos with W88 or W76 warheads.‖ 37 And the hardness of Chinese silos is assessed as comparable.
38
Would-be target facilities can also be located with regard to terrain features such that they are shielded from attack via estimated ballistic trajectories. Chinese DF-5A ICBMs are sheltered in a network of deep underground tunnels beneath high mountains to ensure survivability.
39
Many vital strategic facilities are constructed deeply buried underground. They are impervious to all but -earth-penetrating‖ nuclear weapons. 40 Unfortunately, the Minuteman warhead is not -earth-penetrating.‖ The net effect is a reduced likelihood that a MM III warhead would damage a sufficiently hardened target. This perception also diminishes deterrent credibility.
In addition to this loss of military utility against peer competitors, the Minuteman has lost deterrent utility due to new threats that are non-responsive to Minuteman deterrence. ICBMs were deployed in response to a Warsaw Pact threat and consequently optimized for targets in that general vicinity. Simple calculations based on the Air Force's published range estimate of 6,000 miles rapidly exclude large portions of the globe which are invulnerable to strike and hence not within a sphere of deterrent influence, to include Southern China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and SubSaharan Africa. 41 However, some sources claim the MM III has a range of up to 8,000 miles which includes the entire globe except the southern-most portions of Africa and the Indian subcontinent. 42 Figure 1 depicts range arcs from Minot AFB at 6,000, 7,000, and 8,000 miles.
However, with an assumed longer range, MM III ballistic flight paths to nuclear states require a launch toward and overflight of Russia for any target (excepting those in Europe or Africa). This in itself would trigger the Russian early warning network. 51 Iran has not been deterred from seeking nuclear capabilities. In these scenarios, the MM III is -underkill‖ against those with too little to lose.
Non-deterred non-state actors, e.g., Al Qaeda (AQ), operate in a dispersed transitory noncentralized method without sovereign infrastructure. This results in minimal ability to deter by threatened retaliation with nuclear forces in general. The US was unable to deter attacks on the homeland; AQ was not deterred by alert nuclear forces when it conducted its 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. And the rapid instantaneous launch of a Miniuteman-whose flight path would transit uninvolved sovereign states-against terrorist targets is highly improbable. This points to perhaps to a deficiency in the US willingness to use the Minuteman specifically and nuclear weapons generally.
As previously written, theory states successful deterrence requires a capability coupled with a perceived willingness to use. While the Minuteman's military utility has diminished, the US has also demonstrated a reluctance to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance. In the author's opinion, this reluctance stems from an estimation that nuclear weapon employment is untenable in light of ambiguous effects, acceptable alternatives, and political resistance.
Arguments could be made that the US lacks the political will to use nuclear weapons.
Post-WWII, the US has not employed nuclear weapons in any conflict overseas, even when losing, e.g., Korea, Vietnam. 52 These were not attacks on the homeland, but still there was no nuclear use in response to 9/11 attacks killing nearly 3,000 on American soil. Based on simple estimations, the US could have conducted a limited number of nuclear strikes against AQ locations-suitably isolated targets with no fallout and minimal collateral damage predictionsin Afghanistan. 53 Hence there must be additional factors that preclude use.
In a general sense, the US is unable to employ nuclear systems. Most models to predict damage effects are highly idealized and most appropriate for Cold War planning scenarios when collateral effects were secondary considerations. The US has voluntarily abstained from nuclear testing since 1992. 54 Thus, blast, overpressure, thermal, radiation, and fallout effects are largely ambiguous. Thermal fireball, fallout transport, terrain interaction, blast damage, and population density models are all highly dependent on the methods and assumptions. This can result in variations of over -four orders of magnitude‖-from hundreds to millions killed. 55 A concern with a Minuteman launch is first stage re-entry could damage populated territory. Together, the result is uncertain and problematic collateral weapon effects predictions which restrict nuclear use in all but the most dire of circumstances. There is no compelling requirement for an immediate nuclear strike of 450 missiles, as there is no advantage to the ready salvo Minuteman launch for anything outside of pre-planned and pre-approved mission set. In other cases, the US will have sufficient time to generate an aircraft or sea-launched mission to conduct the strike. The Minuteman is cited for superb response time, but although weapon system execution may be short, the political decision making process will be the constraint. 60 Worse, given technical and operational constraints on use, there is another restriction-the policital impediment.
Tannenwald sums this up with her description of a -nuclear taboo‖-the bomb is not -just another weapon.‖ Domestically it is subject to presidential control, while internationally it is categorized by the UN as a weapon of mass destruction. Popularly it has been vilified as an abhorrent immoral weapon unacceptable for use. Consequently, US leaders have been historically constrained from using nuclear weapons. 61 The result is enormous political resistance to using a nuclear weapon, especially when there are substitute conventional options. 
Recommendations: Changing US Nuclear Deterrent Posture
The US should implement nuclear force posture changes and strategic deterrent policy changes to maintain an assured credible capability commensurate with the threat. These changes include de-alerting and de-activating the MM III force, preserving survivable deterrent forces, adopting a minimum deterrent posture, announcing a new nuclear deterrent policy, and conducting a capabilities shortfall review.
The US should de-alert and deactivate the MM III ICBM force and replace it with a survivable alternative. De-alerting could be accomplished immediately as was done by President George H. W. Bush with the bomber and Minuteman II forces. 63 Next, deactivation of the 450 launch facilities and 45 launch control centers could follow in a phased plan to remove materiel and flow personnel where needed, using the Minuteman II, Peacekeeper, and Minuteman IIIDeuce actions as a template.
There is international precedence for deactivating a land-based missile force due to deterrent obsolescence. The UK stood down their land-based ballistic missile force in 1963. 64 France stood down their ballistic missile force in 1995. Similar to US systems, the French system consisted of fixed hardened launch sites with missiles on constant alert with the range to strike Warsaw Pact targets. Following a capabilities assessment, French officials assessed the 18 launch facilities to be vulnerable to enemy, e.g., Russian, preventative strike and the predictable missile flight paths were vulnerable to enemy defense, i.e., Moscow ABM system. Leaders concluded that these factors limited the system's military utility and rendered their fixed ballistic missiles an ineffective strategic deterrent. 65 It is worth noting that the decision to decommission their missiles was made in lieu of upgrading and modernizing an aging missile force at substantial expense. France opted to maintain instead a seagoing day-to-day alert capability with ballistic missile submarines as well as an aircraft force that could be generated to deliver nuclear strikes.
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In association with a reduced nuclear arsenal, those remaining forces must be preserved as survivable deterrent elements while advanced deterrent capabilities are developed and fielded.
The US must maintain, upgrade, and procure capabilities to ensure survivability of sea-based ballistic missile forces. US ballistic missile submarines are currently superior to any adversary and rely on stealth for their survivability. There is a constant threat, however, that an advance in detection capabilities could eliminate this advantage. A survivable land-based system could mitigate this concern.
To reduce the potential vulnerabilities of an entirely sea-based ballistic missile force, US should acquire a survivable land-based ballistic reserve capability. To overcome the limitations affecting the current ICBM force, any new system should be survivable with regard to basing and target penetration. When examining basing concepts, there is a tradeoff between -dispersed and survivable‖ and -consolidated and secure.‖ The optimum plan would incorporate both. Additionally, any ground-based system must have the capability to overcome defenses.
Penetrating warhead concepts, e.g., maneuverable reentry vehicle and hypersonic glide, should be incorporated to provide an unpredictable flight path to target. Survivable basing and assured penetration would restore a measure of credibility to our deterrent forces in the face of a capable peer adversary.
The history of warfare is replete with advances in offenses and defenses countering each other. Defense of US ICBMs has been essentially stagnant since when the silos were constructed in the 1960s. 69 At the time, survivability was based on the LF being -hard enough‖ of an enemy strike that would not be accurate enough to damage the structure. Adversaries have made considerable strides in the advancement of their ICBM survivability with hardened or mobile systems. But the MM III has foregone the principles of war of maneuver, surprise, economy of force for in-place expediency.
As highlighted in the -new triad‖ report, the US must maintain an adequate nuclear weapons knowledge base to maintain a requisite intellectual capability with regard to nuclear weapons effects, systems engineering, weapons engineering, facility construction, etc. 70 The US should form, resource, and incentivize a partnership among industry, academia, government, and military to establish programs, policies, and capabilities. Prioritized ROTC scholarships for nuclear engineering students, bonuses for nuclear proficiency, nuclear cadre program, etc.
Requisite to revamping the deployed nuclear force structure, the US should conduct a conventional capabilities versus nuclear capabilities review. The intent of the review would be to identify any conventional weapon capability shortfalls, e.g., target types that are insensitive to current conventional weapons effects, but vulnerable to nuclear weapons. Advances in conventional weapons capabilities, to include -bunker busters,‖ -MOABs,‖ and the recently tested -MOP‖ have significantly narrowed the gap between conventional and nuclear capabilities. Nuclear weapons do possess an advantage in blast and overpressure effects, but they are not universally effective against all targets. The capabilities review would further DTRA efforts to identify necessary improvements and upgrades in conventional weapons capabilities to replace any lost nuclear weapons advantages.
In association with changes to nuclear force structure, the US should implement strategic nuclear deterrence policy changes and clarify intentions to restore deterrent credibility. These changes include implementing a minimal deterrence posture, adopting -no first strike‖ policy, engaging with nuclear states for force reductions, and openly announcing US strategic nuclear policy.
Minimal deterrence consists of maintaining only enough nuclear weapons to retaliate with a response that -makes the cost too high‖ for an adversary. As previously discussed, theorists believe the US currently has enough nuclear weapons for minimal deterrence.
Determination of exact levels is beyond the scope of this paper, but a critical review would be required with careful consideration of the role of a land-based deterrent.
The US should openly declare a -no first strike‖ policy to accompany engagement efforts. The US is repeatedly challenged for not having a -no first strike‖ policy and questioned as to why a first strike capability is desired or maintained. China has long advocated that the US adopt a no first strike policy. 71 Such a policy would be intellectually congruent with a minimal deterrent posture and would demonstrate US commitment to a strategic nuclear philosophy that is both defense and deterrence focused. 72 However, some allies have expressed concern over a no first strike policy; the US must seek opportunities for diplomatic and defense engagement to maintain necessary security assurances.
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Adopting a minimal deterrent posture and announcing a no first strike policy provides renewed opportunity to diplomatically engage with Russia and China for reciprocal nuclear force reductions consistent with Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty intent. China has been actively updating its forces, and Russia is on the cusp of modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. 74 Arms reduction efforts would provide an incentive to hold weapons levels at those agreed upon for minimum deterrence. Requisite is an enforceable, verifiable framework similar to those included in previous strategic arms treaties.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper explored geopolitical and technological changes with regard to deterrence theory, the Minuteman III ICBM, and recommended adjustments to US strategic posture. First, this paper reviewed nuclear deterrence, explored the advancement of weapons technology, and provided rationale on why the MM III is no longer relevant for global deterrence. At the core, the Minuteman III has lost a demonstrated capability and a perceived credibility to use it thus eroding its fundamental utility to deter. It is the ultimate use-it or lose-it hair-trigger weapon 76 -a destabilizing target set that invites a first pre-emptive strike. Moreover, it has problematic and uncertain collateral effects and a political resistance to use that makes its employment untenable.
The US should update its nuclear posture and modify its nuclear force structure by dealerting and then deactivating the MM III ICBM force, replacing it with a survivable deterrent elements, and adopting a minimal deterrent posture. The US should conduct a capabilities assessment, develop advanced conventional systems, and formulate and publicize strategic nuclear policy changes to best serve national security objectives.
An updated nuclear force structure and deterrent policy to match current world political and technological landscape could provide the US with a new opportunity to lead the world effort toward verifiable and complete global nuclear disarmament. While some will point to the But in the interim, the US must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent capability. As such, it should abandon the Minuteman III ICBM-a stagnant and dogmatic portion of the triad-and replace it with an evolved and more capable land-based system that will be survivable and effective if needed. This best serves to bolster deterrence and provide for the common defense.
